An Organizational Assessment of Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council: Uncharted Waters

After over a decade of drawn-out discussions and preparations, the Taiwan government’s Ocean Affairs Council (海洋委員會, OAC) was finally established on April 28, 2018. As part of ongoing reforms, the OAC integrates the planning, coordination, and implementation of maritime-related policy as well as other related affairs that were previously scattered among different agencies within the Executive Yuan. According to the OAC Organization Act (海洋委員會組織法), the newly-minted Council has three subordinate agencies: the Coast Guard Administration (海巡署, CGA), the Ocean Conservation Administration (海洋保育署, OCA), and the National Academy of Ocean Research (國家海洋研究院, NAOR). Currently, the OAC has two subordinate agencies: CGA and OCA; and the preparatory office for NAOR (國家海洋研究院籌備處) was established at the same time with the mandate to complete the formal transition process within 12 months.

Looking into the past and beyond for Ocean Affairs Council

The debate over the nature and level of the new agency responsible for maritime affairs has been raging on for more than a decade. Both the Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou governments teetered back-and-forth between whether the new organization should be a “council” or “ministry-level agency” for maritime affairs. The debate eventually settled on council, yet insiders within both major political parties still differ on the matter. The OAC was established, notwithstanding these differences.

Yet, the road ahead is not without challenges. The fact that key administrative matters, such as maritime transportation, fisheries, and maritime spatial planning remain in the original agencies (i.e., the Ministry of Transportation (交通部), the Fisheries Agency (漁業署) and the Ministry of Interior (內政部), respectively) may present jurisdictional challenges for the OAC. No one should expect that the new council can immediately solve all the cross-ministerial policy issues. Looking forward, the experience of OAC in the coordination and deliberation of ocean policies, such as drafting the Ocean Basic Law (海洋基本法) for the forthcoming session of Legislative Yuan, will be a critical benchmark for evaluating whether such “super-ministry” for maritime affairs may be necessary.

Additionally, OAC is the first cabinet-level, central government agency based in Kaohsiung City, in southern Taiwan. The notion of “southward relocation” of the central government away from Taipei is not new, as it was first proposed by former president Chen Shui-bian during his 2004 campaign. The Executive Yuan drafted several “southward relocation” plans for different agencies, but the only one ever to materialize is the Fisheries Agency -the subordinate agency in the Council of Agriculture (農委會). The Fisheries Agency moved to Chienchen Fishing Port (前鎮漁港) of Kaohsiung in 2007. Initially, this seemed to be a favorable move that brought the agency closer to the center of fishing industries. Yet, many of the Fisheries Agency’s officials soon found themselves spending the majority of their time traveling between Taipei and Kaohsiung. As the Legislative Yuan and all the other agencies of the Executive Yuan remain in northern Taiwan, the communication cost was tremendous. Group by group, the Fisheries Agency quietly moved back to its “Taipei Office” in 2008. Though the headquarter of the Fisheries Agency is officially still based in Chienchen Fishing Port, many of the divisions -including the office of director-general — are already in Taipei as of 2014.

The rather unsuccessful “southward relocation” of the Fisheries Agency may serve as a cautionary tale for OAC. Within the new agency, the core administrative units of CGA, including its headquarter (署本部), are still located in northern Taiwan. While teleconferencing may be a solution, this is not a common practice among governmental agencies in Taiwan. Distance limits the knowledge spillover that may create an unfavorable environment for policy discussion. It remains to be seen how OAC will overcome such limitations.

Restructuring and Reinforcing the Coast Guard Administration (CGA)

CGA is a pre-existing agency and has already undergone a series of restructuring. Following the restructuring, each Patrol Office (巡防局) previously under the Coastal Patrol Directorate General (海岸巡防總局) became an independent Branch (分署) — with a Northern, Central, Southern, Eastern, Kinmen-Matsu-Penghu (金馬澎) and Dongsha-Nansha (東南沙) branch. Other subordinate branches include the Fleet Branch (艦隊分署, formerly Maritime Patrol Directorate General (海洋巡防總局)), the Investigation Branch (偵防分署), which combines the Special Task Unit (特勤隊), and the Reconnaissance Brigades (查緝隊) from both of the former Directorate Generals, and finally the Education, Training & Testing Center (教育訓練與測考中心).

With its core mission as maritime law enforcement, maritime services, and maritime affairs, the “white-hulls” of CGA is often viewed as less escalatory than their “grey-hull” counterparts in the Taiwan Navy. While lacking the platform for dialogue and cooperation with other coast guards, CGA still finds room for maneuver to promote maritime security. As a member of the Western-Central Pacific Fisheries Commissions (WCPFC), CGA performs annual high-sea boarding and inspection mission on behalf of Taiwan. These missions also provide a unique channel for consolidating the friendship with Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in West-Central Pacific, such as the Marshall Islands, which signed an agreement on coast guard cooperation with Taiwanthis July.

The main priority for CGA is capacity building to fulfill the mission demands. The Fleet Branch currently suffers the most from the lack of capacity. It has around 149 of patrol boats, ships, and cutters [1]. These vessels are assigned into 15 Offshore Flotillas (海巡隊), 4 Sector Flotillas (機動海巡隊, including North, Central, South and East) and 1 Fleet of Direct Access (直屬船隊). The Offshore Flotillas are responsible for patrol within 24 nautical miles (contiguous zone). Each Offshore Flotilla is usually equipped with 3 to 7 patrol boats of 20, 35, 50 to 100-ton class. The Sector Flotillas are responsible for patrol within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and are usually equipped with cutters above 500 tons. Finally, the Fleet of Direct Access is responsible for high sea and EEZ patrol and is equipped with 1,000-ton class patrol ship [2].

Nearly 15 years ago in 2003, the United Ship Design & Development Center (聯合船舶設計發展中心, now Ship and Ocean Industries R&D Center 船舶暨海洋產業研發中心) carried out a study to estimate the ship and aircraft demand of CGA (海岸巡防署艦艇及航空器需求之研究). The study recommended that each Offshore Flotilla has at least 10 patrol boats for 3-shifts patrol everyday with acceptable vessel availability. In summary, they assessed that CGA needed around 19 cutters of 500-tons (or above) class, 197 patrol boats, 5 patrol ships of 3,500-ton class, and various specific purpose boats to fulfill its mission demands in the next 15 years. Comparing the suggested numbers with the size of the current fleet, CGA is seriously under-equipped.

Therefore, in 2015 CGA announced a shipbuilding program to add 4 cutters of 4,000-ton class, 6 cutters of 1,000-ton class, 12 cutters of 600-ton class, 17 patrol boats of 100-ton class, 52 patrol boats of 35-ton class, and 50 multi-function patrol boats after the establishment of OAC. Most tenders started in the summer of 2018 with expected delivery to begin from 2019 to 2027, except the turn-key bidding for 6 cutters of 1,000-ton class and construction bidding of 17 patrol boats of 100-ton class, which are scheduled for 2019.

The ongoing discussions on the CGA’s shipbuilding program mainly focus around 4,000-ton class and 600-ton class cutters; both are new ship classes with civil-mil transition (平戰轉換) capability and expected to start the sea trial on 2020. The 4,000-ton class cutters will be the largest ever built by CGA, as a response to the increasing law enforcement mission demands in the East and South China Seas. The design reportedly will be based on a next generation frigate (also known as Project Cheng-Hai (震海計畫)) of the Taiwan Navy, and it will reserve space for operation and weapon system that can be rapidly installed during wartime. It will also include medical facility and personnel onboard for conducting humanitarian missions as “field hospital.” In accordance with the policy guideline of promoting indigenous shipbuilding (國艦國造), the NT$ 10.4 billion contract (US$ 347.9 million) of 4,000-ton class cutters has been awarded to CSBC Corporation (台灣國際造船) in July 2018.

The other new ship class, 600-ton class cutters, has been hotly debated since the program was announced. The design of these cutters will be based on Taiwan Navy’s 500-ton Tuo-Chiang class missile corvette (沱江艦), which has a catamaran design and is capable of maximum speed of 38 knots per hour. CGA values the corvette’s high speed for chasing smugglers and fast-attack capability when equipped with modular missile container bays for indigenous anti-ship missiles (i.e. HF-2 and HF-3).

The new design, however, appears to ignore the CGA’s previous development in ship design and experience in law enforcement and as such faces many criticisms internally and externally. The design of the current 700-ton class cutters, such as CG116 “Taipei” and CG112 “Nantou,” are modified from the Jin-Chiang corvette (錦江級) of the Taiwan Navy. This design could have been upgraded with years of actual deployment experience. On the other hand, the new ships’ seaworthiness under severe conditions and high freeboard (6 meter from the waterline to the upper deck level) unfavorable for boarding inspection has been questioned. As replies to these criticisms, CGA stressed that further modification in ship design would address these issues.

Besides finalizing details of ship design, this contract challenges the capabilities in financial and project management for the bidder with all 12 cutters bid at once with delivery of 1 to 2 cutters every year from 2020. To the surprise of many observers, this contract was finally awarded to Jong Shyn Shipbuilding (中信造船) in a rare 4th call for bid. The shipyard that built the prototype of Tuo-Chiang class, Lung Teh Shipbuilding (龍德造船), did not join the final bid. There is speculation that Lung Teh decided not to bid because of conflict in the schedule of the Tuo-Chiang class further production and the small profit margin for CGA’s project.

Perhaps even more critical is how will CGA fill the personnel gaps when these cutters and patrol boats are delivered. As identified by the National Audit Office (審計部) in the 2017 Performance Report (106年中央政府總決算報告), the shortage of Fleet Branch has reached 32.22 percent of its authorized complement. The increases in budget complement every year since 2002 is still unable to fill the gap and hiring externally has become the new normal.

While many issues need to be solved, CGA is undoubtedly the primary administrative agency in Taiwan for enforcing maritime sovereignty and jurisdictional rights.

The main point: Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council will need several years for establishing its own policy planning capacity and the channels of coordination and deliberation with the other agencies.

[1] In the official document of CGA, the cutter is usually referred as “frigate.” I will use “cutter” as in US Coast Guard through the article to make the distinction for law enforcement usage.

[2] See the agenda related document of Legislative Yuan (立法院議案關係文書) №887: Governmental proposal №15100–378 (院總第887號 政府提案第15100號之378).

This commentary originally appeared in Global Taiwan Brief on October 3, 2018


上週六我在 Geneva.Zone (instagramtelegram) 網路座談分享,包括八月時在雅加達舉行的 Disinformation & Disclosure 研討會(我的會後紀錄)以及暑期學校中與來自亞洲各地參與者互動的經驗,得到參與者的一些迴響。雖然我一個人幾乎講了將近一個半小時,回頭想想,可能有幾個概念需要再說明一下。

所謂的南營(Global South)原先指在政治、社會與經濟的南北分歧中之發展中國家,西德總理威利.布蘭特曾經在一份報告中(註1),依照北緯30度線將南北分歧在世界地圖上畫出來,看起來就像一隻貓在玩球。全球數位落差,也約略符合這個脈絡。



談假新聞,或者說資訊症候群(information disorder),無可避免的必須討論人與資訊、資訊與科技、科技與人的關係。科技與社會研究(Science, Technology and Society)最常提到的大概就屬傅柯(Michel Foucault),對於主體性以及知識/權力論述。我們對主體的認識來自資訊,資訊產生則是源自一個現有的權力架構(註2)。Nishant Shah(Center of Internet and Society 共同創辦人,目前是荷蘭ArtEZ藝術大學的學術長)在暑期學校時,以身體作為比喻。自然獲得性別角色者所呈現的表徵,是原生資訊的集合體,而且已經內化而不需要經過思考。就像每天早上起床,決定要穿什麼衣服,通常不需要太多時間。


從這個角度理解 misinformation, disinformation, malinformation,就會發現一般討論並不會試圖解析、了解這個建構過程。在打「假」以前,或許可以先想想「真」是怎麼產生的。

除了主體,知識/權力,另外一項和資訊有關的現象是資訊過載(Information overload)。

生活在數位時代 (digital age)的我們,或許已經認為這是再正常不過的常態。不過,公元前埃及的亞歷山大圖書館,曾經是世界上最大的圖書館、人類知識的集大成,希臘文化的中心,全盛時期藏書約40–70萬卷,大約只有台大圖書館的1/6。

亞歷山大圖書館兩次被毀後,有很長一段時間,知識掌握在教會手上。中世紀時,教會對於一個人能夠接收多少資訊有過許多辯論,認為若掌握太多資訊,將會使道德(moral)有所減損。而奧古斯丁 (St. Augustine)所提出的光照理論,就是解決資訊與道德間的困境,強調透過來自上帝的神聖光照(dividine illumination)獲取知識,以及透過愛上帝來使自身品性良善。


大量的資訊造成虛假的親密感(false intimacy),因此得到和記憶不符的資訊時,就破壞了這樣的信任關係,造成心理或道德上的衝突,也就是所謂的背叛。比起訊息真偽與否,破壞信任/親密感的背叛(information betrayal)恐怕才是真正觸發情緒反應並且付諸行動的關鍵。


無論是否願意,我們都已經成了賽博格(cyborg, 註3) — 是人與科技的混合體,也同時反應環境與虛構的造物。

註1:作為西德總理,威利.布蘭特(Willy Brandt)最出名的,大概是讓他得到諾貝爾和平獎的華沙之跪,不過這裡指的是他擔任國際發展議題獨立委員會(Independent Commission on International Development Issues)主席時的那份布蘭特報告


註3:詳見 Haraway, D. (1985) «A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century». Simians, cyborgs and women: the reinvention of nature, 149–81.(中譯本由群學出版)

Disinformation & Discourse: Notes from Symposium

Disinformation and Filter bubble

(Note: This is remark from 1-day symposium at August 21 in Jakarta, Indonesia by Digital Asia Hub, Berkman Klein Center and Chatham House. I participated on behalf of Open Knowledge Taiwan. The symposium adopted Chatham House Rule, so I will only write about what has been discussed in the symposium without specified the speaker unless it is already in public)

The global disinformation landscape

What is disinformation? In Chinese we often use the fakenews (假新聞) or disinformation (不實消息). But the distinction is not very clear. Based on the “Information Disorder” report by Council of Europe, we can find the following definition:

  • Dis-information. Information that is false and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization or country.
  • Mis-information. Information that is false, but not created with the intention of causing harm.
  • Mal-information. Information that is based on reality, used to inflict harm on a person, organization or country.

Such distinction is based on a spectrum from “falseness” to “intend to harm.” When the term “fake news” is used, usually it is in the context of “disinformation” and “misinformation.” Within this broad spectrum, several distinct types of problematic contents exist.Fake news. It’s complicated.
By Claire Wardle, First Draft News Research

Among them, the satire content receives less attention. But it is potentially a source of misinformation/disinformation, depending on how much the harm will do. Satire, art, comedy and humor are also freedom of expression that may subject to state interference.

People’s Daily Quotes the Onion: Kim Jong Eun ‘Sexiest Man Alive’
The People’s Daily newspaper posted on its website a 55-photo slideshow dedicated to North Korean dictator Kim Jong…

Is freedom of expression only about “correct” information? Not necessarily so, as pointed out by David Kaye. It can be a tool of authoritarian state. This has become a huge controversy for Malaysia’s anti-fake news law, as Barisan Nasional aims at silencing any criticism before the general election.

Legal approach

Germany’s Network Enforcement Act (Netzdurchsetzunggesetz, or NetzDG) is probably the most widely cited example as a legal approach for fake news. But it has been criticized by both academic and civil society for following reasons:

  1. Difficulty to define the scope “big social media networks”
  2. Take-down within 24 hour if obviously illegal and within 7 days for the rest is a possible violation of freedom of speech guarantees

Germany: Flawed Social Media Law
The new German law that compels social media companies to remove hate speech and other illegal content can lead to…

Although German scholar sent a clear message said “Don’t copy German’s approach,” it couldn’t stop Russia from direct copy-and-paste into national law.

Russian bill is copy-and-paste of Germany’s hate speech law | Reporters without borders
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) condemns a Russian bill that would force social networks to remove “unlawful” content…

What remain to be seen are the transboundary cases. Although the offense may be sanctioned even if it is not committed in Germany, no foreign case has been established so far. As mentioned by the speaker, there are some discussion about whether the mutual legal assistance in criminal matters between US and Germany covers the criminal offense on “big social networks.”

Role of Platform

Platforms are based on attention-seeking economy works a bit different from advertising. Thus, platforms have a complex role in fake news as it has some clear economical drives. During the symposium, we found local differences that changes the way platform interact:

Why Facebook is losing the war on hate speech in Myanmar
YANGON, Myanmar – In April, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg told U.S. senators that the social media site was hiring…

Disinformation and democracy in Indonesia – New Mandala
“Fake news” has become a buzzword in the contemporary political lexicon around the world. In Indonesia, there has been…

How South Korea’s Fake News Hijacked a Democratic Crisis
On Thursday night, South Korean president Park Geun-Hye was officially ousted from her office after a special…

Different platforms has different approaches. But like many other occasions, the most discussed platform did not have someone to speak on their behalf in this symposium. In additions, it’s often the case that platform under/overestimating the capacity of user in solving the disinformation. AI is unlikely to solve it either.

Final Remark

Fakenews is like Monster “Hydra” : you chop one head and there will be two grow out immediately.

Most of the participant agree that quality journalism, media diversity and digital literacy can be solution in the long term. Although not mentioning explicitly in the symposium, the problems identified are mostly about trust. There are some questions may be worth thinking about:

  • What can we learn from other behavior-change campaign? (such as in public health)
  • After the war is over, what kind of society we would like to have?




緊追權 (hot pursuit) 指的是聯合國海洋法公約第111條,當沿海國認為外國船舶違反該國法律和規章時,沿海國的公務船舶(包括軍艦、軍用飛機)可對該外國船舶進行緊追。此時外國船舶必須位在沿海國的內水、群島水域、領海或毗連區內,但如果沿海國在專屬經濟區內或大陸架上依照海洋法公約制定法律和規章,外國船舶違反相關規定,也可比照適用緊追權。



Status of Open Access in Taiwan 2017

(Extended version of my lightening talk at #FORCE2017, Berlin)

I am Chen-Yi Tu, PhD candidate from Institute of Oceanography, National Taiwan University. As an fisheries oceanographer, I study the climate impact to fish distribution. My research would not be possible if the climate and stock assessment dataset were not available. One of my published articles is about fisheries in Sea of Japan. The institutional repositories in Japan provided access to several crucial articles that none of the library in Taiwan subscribes those journals. I always feel indebted to these services. So the experiences lead me to the open movement, particularly on open data, open access and open science.

Before start talking about the open access, perhaps we should take a look of this map. There are more people living inside the circle than outside of it- that’s why it is necessary to discuss open access from Asia perspectives. Also, the high population density and increasing level of educations imply that open access in Asia can potentially reach out to more people. But before that, we need to get to know the status quo.

In Taiwan, the statistics show we have around 180000 researchers in 2013. From 2009 to 2013, these researchers published about 131300 papers on scientific journals. That is, most of the researcher published at least one paper during this interval. But this governmental report does not provide information on how many of these papers are open access.

Lack of information may actually implies a lack of policy and strategy. This is not just found in Taiwan. This year I contributed to Asia Open Access Regional Survey by Asia OA, which is a special forum hosted by Coalition of Open Access Repositories (COAR). This survey is aiming at providing account of open access in 16 regions of Asia. The report can be found at COAR website. Generally speaking, the regions that responded to survey are active in terms of open access. But many of them do not yet have a cohesive strategy. Also, lack of funding hinders the development of infrastructure to support open access. Hence, the open access activities in these regions are often very distributed and uncoordinated.

In Taiwan, the main funding agency (Ministry of Science and Technology) has no open access policy at all. But we do have open-access institutional repositories- 127 out of 159 universities (including public and private) have institutional repository. All the information can be found at “Taiwan Academic Institutional Repository” portal.

For local open access journals, Directory of Open Access Journal (DOAJ)provides an overview. There are 31 open access journals in Taiwan. Most of these open access journals adopt CC BY-NC-ND licenses (22), with few exceptions for CC BY (4).

The future looks dim, but there is still hope. I would explain in the following two stories.

  • Collective negotiation with Elsevier over ScienceDirect

Last year, Nature broke a news with title “Scientists in Germany, Peru and Taiwan to lose access to Elsevier Journals.” There are many discussion on how Germany managed to negotiate a deal with Dutch publishing giant Elsevier and promoted open access at many levels, but what happens in details and afterward receives less attention. Basically, Taiwan’s universities collectively started negotiation of the subscription deal with Elsevier over ScienceDirect at April last year. Because of the raising subscription fee almost consumed the whole budget for database subscription for many universities, the negotiation unsurprisingly broke in December.

Elsevier started to negotiate with each university individually. But National Taiwan University library said no, other universities also followed. I remembered receiving an email from the university library to all the students and faculties, explaining this situation and providing alternative- free article delivery among libraries before they can make a deal with Elsevier. Fortunately, the negotiation resumed this January and finally reached an agreement and the primary target. The subscription resumed in June.

Most of the students and faculties I know are supportive to the library’s action. Although they may not immediately shift to open access, it shows that people are aware of the issue of paywall and high subscription fee at least in NTU.

  • Open access journal “Zoological Studies” by Biodiversity Research Center, Academia Sinica

Zoological Studies” is an open access international journal that publishes peer-reviewed articles. It is supported by Biodiversity Research Center of Academia Sinica. It seems to be a stand-alone journal without collaborating with large publisher, but it actually was published by Springer from 2013 to 2015.

Back then, I was worried about the issue of “mixed” open access journals and felt that “Zoological Studies” would one day becomes victim of it. Surprisingly, “Zoological Studies” ceased to publish with SpringerOpen at the end of 2015. I asked one of the editors about how the decision was made, he said: “It is actually much more cheaper to publish all by ourselves! Besides, the amount of work for the editors was almost the same after publish with Springer- even increases because of the communication cost.”

It is also worth-noting that the impact factor for “Zoological Studies” jumps back to 1.008 this year, higher than the end of 2015 (0.885). It suggests that big publisher does not guarantee an increase of impact factor- just contrary to a common belief.

To sum up, I would describe the status of open access in Taiwan as a “bottom up process.” Though no official policy for open access, there are many individual/ organizational efforts to keep the academic work open to the public: providing the dataset and scripts along with articles, offering preprints of one’s own papers and maintaining an open access journal. These accumulating efforts may, one day, cause a “paradigm shift” to the scholarly communication in Taiwan.

Inverted polygon

接續昨天的SOSI,在公眾領域的地理圖資裡面,很常被提到的應該就屬Natural Earth。這是一項由北美製圖資訊學會支持的計畫,有向量圖也有點陣圖,應有盡有,非常好用

不過,在Quickstart的範例裡面,海洋和陸地是分成兩個圖層,如果另外把海洋圖層單獨拉進一個新的地圖專案,自動填滿會是陸地,而不是海洋,這時需要在樣式 (style) 部分選 Inverted polygon,就可以填滿陸地以外的區域。


SOSI: Samordnet Opplegg for Stedfestet Informasjon


ESRI在全世界攻城掠地,shapefile幾乎已經成為某種業界標準的今日,挪威還是發展出自己的一套地理圖資格式,叫做SOSI,這個格式是開放標準 (open standard),由挪威地圖局負責維護。文件相當齊全,對於檔案格式以及各版本異同有非常詳盡的說明—只要你看得懂挪威語。

在地圖局資料庫的網站上 ,有各式各樣的圖資檔案,但幾乎都是SOSI格式。若要輸入GIS軟體如ArcGIS和QGIS作進一步製圖,有兩種作法:

  1. GDAL

GDAL是一個以python寫成的地理圖資資料格式函式庫,目前支援SOSI的讀取,而SOSICON則是將SOSI檔案轉換為shapefile或PostGIS可以讀取的格式。GDAL和QGIS Palma似乎有衝突,先轉換為shapefile則可以避免。




上週三開放知識基金會創辦人Rufus Pollock來台的公開活動,感謝Rocket.cafe的邀請,以及科技部、電信所提供的協助。演講以及簡報週一也都放上網了


這點滔滔夥伴在會前就討論過了,我們的答案是:不會。除了現實上的考量外,也是因為由擁有領域知識 (domain knowlege) 優勢的我們參賽,雖然可能會增加得名的機會,但讓對漁業陌生的參賽者有機會接觸這些議題,才能夠使魚客松這個活動發揮最大的價值。如果最終目標是永續發展,光是我們懂不夠,我們希望大家都懂。



1952年 日本海上保安廳成立,民間船廠開始承造海保船艦,設計由船舶設計協會負責(常務理事為原海軍艦政本部第四部設計主任牧野茂)。川崎、三菱兩船廠中有建造潛艦經驗的民間技術人員組成「潛水艦懇談會」,討論國造潛艦的可能性。

1954年 海上自衛隊成立,正式討論可行的潛艦計畫,船舶設計協會提出250噸、500噸與1000噸三種設計方案,最後確定採用1000噸型。同年組成調查團赴美考察,欲取得美軍首艘採用淚滴型艦身設計的試驗潛艦USS Albacore*相關資料,未果。

1956年 海上自衛隊年度預算編列潛艦建造費用(當時為二十七億兩千萬日圓)


1959年 初代親潮號下水,並於隔年成軍

1960年 防衛省研究技術本部(相當於美國的DARPA)持續對淚滴型艦身進行研究與水槽試驗

1967年 由於淚滴型艦身試驗已取得初步成果,第三次防衛力整備計畫中,將建造五艘單軸推進淚滴型艦身的潛艦列為其中一項目標

1969年 渦潮級初艦渦潮、次艦湧潮下水,隸屬位於吳基地的第一潛水隊群


* Albacore中文叫做「長鰭鮪」,通常拿來做罐頭,也就是俗稱的「海底雞」,大概就是因為這樣被誤譯成青花魚 (mackerel) 的,不過真正的青花魚級 (Mackerel class) 是二戰前的試驗潛艦!