An Organizational Assessment of Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council: Uncharted Waters

After over a decade of drawn-out discussions and preparations, the Taiwan government’s Ocean Affairs Council (海洋委員會, OAC) was finally established on April 28, 2018. As part of ongoing reforms, the OAC integrates the planning, coordination, and implementation of maritime-related policy as well as other related affairs that were previously scattered among different agencies within the Executive Yuan. According to the OAC Organization Act (海洋委員會組織法), the newly-minted Council has three subordinate agencies: the Coast Guard Administration (海巡署, CGA), the Ocean Conservation Administration (海洋保育署, OCA), and the National Academy of Ocean Research (國家海洋研究院, NAOR). Currently, the OAC has two subordinate agencies: CGA and OCA; and the preparatory office for NAOR (國家海洋研究院籌備處) was established at the same time with the mandate to complete the formal transition process within 12 months.

Looking into the past and beyond for Ocean Affairs Council

The debate over the nature and level of the new agency responsible for maritime affairs has been raging on for more than a decade. Both the Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou governments teetered back-and-forth between whether the new organization should be a “council” or “ministry-level agency” for maritime affairs. The debate eventually settled on council, yet insiders within both major political parties still differ on the matter. The OAC was established, notwithstanding these differences.

Yet, the road ahead is not without challenges. The fact that key administrative matters, such as maritime transportation, fisheries, and maritime spatial planning remain in the original agencies (i.e., the Ministry of Transportation (交通部), the Fisheries Agency (漁業署) and the Ministry of Interior (內政部), respectively) may present jurisdictional challenges for the OAC. No one should expect that the new council can immediately solve all the cross-ministerial policy issues. Looking forward, the experience of OAC in the coordination and deliberation of ocean policies, such as drafting the Ocean Basic Law (海洋基本法) for the forthcoming session of Legislative Yuan, will be a critical benchmark for evaluating whether such “super-ministry” for maritime affairs may be necessary.

Additionally, OAC is the first cabinet-level, central government agency based in Kaohsiung City, in southern Taiwan. The notion of “southward relocation” of the central government away from Taipei is not new, as it was first proposed by former president Chen Shui-bian during his 2004 campaign. The Executive Yuan drafted several “southward relocation” plans for different agencies, but the only one ever to materialize is the Fisheries Agency -the subordinate agency in the Council of Agriculture (農委會). The Fisheries Agency moved to Chienchen Fishing Port (前鎮漁港) of Kaohsiung in 2007. Initially, this seemed to be a favorable move that brought the agency closer to the center of fishing industries. Yet, many of the Fisheries Agency’s officials soon found themselves spending the majority of their time traveling between Taipei and Kaohsiung. As the Legislative Yuan and all the other agencies of the Executive Yuan remain in northern Taiwan, the communication cost was tremendous. Group by group, the Fisheries Agency quietly moved back to its “Taipei Office” in 2008. Though the headquarter of the Fisheries Agency is officially still based in Chienchen Fishing Port, many of the divisions -including the office of director-general — are already in Taipei as of 2014.

The rather unsuccessful “southward relocation” of the Fisheries Agency may serve as a cautionary tale for OAC. Within the new agency, the core administrative units of CGA, including its headquarter (署本部), are still located in northern Taiwan. While teleconferencing may be a solution, this is not a common practice among governmental agencies in Taiwan. Distance limits the knowledge spillover that may create an unfavorable environment for policy discussion. It remains to be seen how OAC will overcome such limitations.

Restructuring and Reinforcing the Coast Guard Administration (CGA)

CGA is a pre-existing agency and has already undergone a series of restructuring. Following the restructuring, each Patrol Office (巡防局) previously under the Coastal Patrol Directorate General (海岸巡防總局) became an independent Branch (分署) — with a Northern, Central, Southern, Eastern, Kinmen-Matsu-Penghu (金馬澎) and Dongsha-Nansha (東南沙) branch. Other subordinate branches include the Fleet Branch (艦隊分署, formerly Maritime Patrol Directorate General (海洋巡防總局)), the Investigation Branch (偵防分署), which combines the Special Task Unit (特勤隊), and the Reconnaissance Brigades (查緝隊) from both of the former Directorate Generals, and finally the Education, Training & Testing Center (教育訓練與測考中心).

With its core mission as maritime law enforcement, maritime services, and maritime affairs, the “white-hulls” of CGA is often viewed as less escalatory than their “grey-hull” counterparts in the Taiwan Navy. While lacking the platform for dialogue and cooperation with other coast guards, CGA still finds room for maneuver to promote maritime security. As a member of the Western-Central Pacific Fisheries Commissions (WCPFC), CGA performs annual high-sea boarding and inspection mission on behalf of Taiwan. These missions also provide a unique channel for consolidating the friendship with Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in West-Central Pacific, such as the Marshall Islands, which signed an agreement on coast guard cooperation with Taiwanthis July.

The main priority for CGA is capacity building to fulfill the mission demands. The Fleet Branch currently suffers the most from the lack of capacity. It has around 149 of patrol boats, ships, and cutters [1]. These vessels are assigned into 15 Offshore Flotillas (海巡隊), 4 Sector Flotillas (機動海巡隊, including North, Central, South and East) and 1 Fleet of Direct Access (直屬船隊). The Offshore Flotillas are responsible for patrol within 24 nautical miles (contiguous zone). Each Offshore Flotilla is usually equipped with 3 to 7 patrol boats of 20, 35, 50 to 100-ton class. The Sector Flotillas are responsible for patrol within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and are usually equipped with cutters above 500 tons. Finally, the Fleet of Direct Access is responsible for high sea and EEZ patrol and is equipped with 1,000-ton class patrol ship [2].

Nearly 15 years ago in 2003, the United Ship Design & Development Center (聯合船舶設計發展中心, now Ship and Ocean Industries R&D Center 船舶暨海洋產業研發中心) carried out a study to estimate the ship and aircraft demand of CGA (海岸巡防署艦艇及航空器需求之研究). The study recommended that each Offshore Flotilla has at least 10 patrol boats for 3-shifts patrol everyday with acceptable vessel availability. In summary, they assessed that CGA needed around 19 cutters of 500-tons (or above) class, 197 patrol boats, 5 patrol ships of 3,500-ton class, and various specific purpose boats to fulfill its mission demands in the next 15 years. Comparing the suggested numbers with the size of the current fleet, CGA is seriously under-equipped.

Therefore, in 2015 CGA announced a shipbuilding program to add 4 cutters of 4,000-ton class, 6 cutters of 1,000-ton class, 12 cutters of 600-ton class, 17 patrol boats of 100-ton class, 52 patrol boats of 35-ton class, and 50 multi-function patrol boats after the establishment of OAC. Most tenders started in the summer of 2018 with expected delivery to begin from 2019 to 2027, except the turn-key bidding for 6 cutters of 1,000-ton class and construction bidding of 17 patrol boats of 100-ton class, which are scheduled for 2019.

The ongoing discussions on the CGA’s shipbuilding program mainly focus around 4,000-ton class and 600-ton class cutters; both are new ship classes with civil-mil transition (平戰轉換) capability and expected to start the sea trial on 2020. The 4,000-ton class cutters will be the largest ever built by CGA, as a response to the increasing law enforcement mission demands in the East and South China Seas. The design reportedly will be based on a next generation frigate (also known as Project Cheng-Hai (震海計畫)) of the Taiwan Navy, and it will reserve space for operation and weapon system that can be rapidly installed during wartime. It will also include medical facility and personnel onboard for conducting humanitarian missions as “field hospital.” In accordance with the policy guideline of promoting indigenous shipbuilding (國艦國造), the NT$ 10.4 billion contract (US$ 347.9 million) of 4,000-ton class cutters has been awarded to CSBC Corporation (台灣國際造船) in July 2018.

The other new ship class, 600-ton class cutters, has been hotly debated since the program was announced. The design of these cutters will be based on Taiwan Navy’s 500-ton Tuo-Chiang class missile corvette (沱江艦), which has a catamaran design and is capable of maximum speed of 38 knots per hour. CGA values the corvette’s high speed for chasing smugglers and fast-attack capability when equipped with modular missile container bays for indigenous anti-ship missiles (i.e. HF-2 and HF-3).

The new design, however, appears to ignore the CGA’s previous development in ship design and experience in law enforcement and as such faces many criticisms internally and externally. The design of the current 700-ton class cutters, such as CG116 “Taipei” and CG112 “Nantou,” are modified from the Jin-Chiang corvette (錦江級) of the Taiwan Navy. This design could have been upgraded with years of actual deployment experience. On the other hand, the new ships’ seaworthiness under severe conditions and high freeboard (6 meter from the waterline to the upper deck level) unfavorable for boarding inspection has been questioned. As replies to these criticisms, CGA stressed that further modification in ship design would address these issues.

Besides finalizing details of ship design, this contract challenges the capabilities in financial and project management for the bidder with all 12 cutters bid at once with delivery of 1 to 2 cutters every year from 2020. To the surprise of many observers, this contract was finally awarded to Jong Shyn Shipbuilding (中信造船) in a rare 4th call for bid. The shipyard that built the prototype of Tuo-Chiang class, Lung Teh Shipbuilding (龍德造船), did not join the final bid. There is speculation that Lung Teh decided not to bid because of conflict in the schedule of the Tuo-Chiang class further production and the small profit margin for CGA’s project.

Perhaps even more critical is how will CGA fill the personnel gaps when these cutters and patrol boats are delivered. As identified by the National Audit Office (審計部) in the 2017 Performance Report (106年中央政府總決算報告), the shortage of Fleet Branch has reached 32.22 percent of its authorized complement. The increases in budget complement every year since 2002 is still unable to fill the gap and hiring externally has become the new normal.

While many issues need to be solved, CGA is undoubtedly the primary administrative agency in Taiwan for enforcing maritime sovereignty and jurisdictional rights.

The main point: Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council will need several years for establishing its own policy planning capacity and the channels of coordination and deliberation with the other agencies.


[1] In the official document of CGA, the cutter is usually referred as “frigate.” I will use “cutter” as in US Coast Guard through the article to make the distinction for law enforcement usage.

[2] See the agenda related document of Legislative Yuan (立法院議案關係文書) №887: Governmental proposal №15100–378 (院總第887號 政府提案第15100號之378).

This commentary originally appeared in Global Taiwan Brief on October 3, 2018

南營、資訊過載與賽博格

上週六我在 Geneva.Zone (instagramtelegram) 網路座談分享,包括八月時在雅加達舉行的 Disinformation & Disclosure 研討會(我的會後紀錄)以及暑期學校中與來自亞洲各地參與者互動的經驗,得到參與者的一些迴響。雖然我一個人幾乎講了將近一個半小時,回頭想想,可能有幾個概念需要再說明一下。

所謂的南營(Global South)原先指在政治、社會與經濟的南北分歧中之發展中國家,西德總理威利.布蘭特曾經在一份報告中(註1),依照北緯30度線將南北分歧在世界地圖上畫出來,看起來就像一隻貓在玩球。全球數位落差,也約略符合這個脈絡。

近年資通訊基礎建設加速後,南營國家也成了眾多網路公司爭奪下一個十億用戶的布局重地。亞洲經濟發展快速,自然是有目共睹,如東南亞島嶼部的印尼,南亞的印度次大陸,再加上南美的巴西和非洲的奈及利亞。除了及少數的例外,在一般華文媒體傳達的訊息中,通常對這些國家發生的事情只有簡單帶過。然而在假新聞議題裡,這些國家各自的媒體生態,呈現出非常複雜的產生—傳遞網路。

我在和與會友人分享時,總是會想著台灣的經驗,可以如何與南營國家對話?有哪些能夠互相借鏡之處?不過,在那之前,免不了要談社會背景和環境,但光是想到要跟印尼朋友解釋台灣的移工現況,還有聽他們說當地華僑種種,有時就足以讓人羞愧到抬不起頭來。


談假新聞,或者說資訊症候群(information disorder),無可避免的必須討論人與資訊、資訊與科技、科技與人的關係。科技與社會研究(Science, Technology and Society)最常提到的大概就屬傅柯(Michel Foucault),對於主體性以及知識/權力論述。我們對主體的認識來自資訊,資訊產生則是源自一個現有的權力架構(註2)。Nishant Shah(Center of Internet and Society 共同創辦人,目前是荷蘭ArtEZ藝術大學的學術長)在暑期學校時,以身體作為比喻。自然獲得性別角色者所呈現的表徵,是原生資訊的集合體,而且已經內化而不需要經過思考。就像每天早上起床,決定要穿什麼衣服,通常不需要太多時間。

但是跨性別者則不然。由於缺乏原生資訊,為了在這樣的身體上重新建構性別角色,跨性別者需要精心規劃,透過科技/技術的協助,來突破主體的限制。他人接收到的訊息是科技的結果,而在觀看—被觀看的途徑互動下,強化了兩方的回饋,結果就是跨性別者身上,時常呈現出比自然獲得性別角色者更強化的性別意象(Hypersexuality)。

從這個角度理解 misinformation, disinformation, malinformation,就會發現一般討論並不會試圖解析、了解這個建構過程。在打「假」以前,或許可以先想想「真」是怎麼產生的。


除了主體,知識/權力,另外一項和資訊有關的現象是資訊過載(Information overload)。

生活在數位時代 (digital age)的我們,或許已經認為這是再正常不過的常態。不過,公元前埃及的亞歷山大圖書館,曾經是世界上最大的圖書館、人類知識的集大成,希臘文化的中心,全盛時期藏書約40–70萬卷,大約只有台大圖書館的1/6。

亞歷山大圖書館兩次被毀後,有很長一段時間,知識掌握在教會手上。中世紀時,教會對於一個人能夠接收多少資訊有過許多辯論,認為若掌握太多資訊,將會使道德(moral)有所減損。而奧古斯丁 (St. Augustine)所提出的光照理論,就是解決資訊與道德間的困境,強調透過來自上帝的神聖光照(dividine illumination)獲取知識,以及透過愛上帝來使自身品性良善。

這個概念一直持續到印刷術出現,但對資訊過載現象的認知,似乎是最近才從例外轉為常態。經過數千年歷史的演進,人類處理大量訊息的能力,有明顯變化嗎?記憶容量依舊是有限的。

大量的資訊造成虛假的親密感(false intimacy),因此得到和記憶不符的資訊時,就破壞了這樣的信任關係,造成心理或道德上的衝突,也就是所謂的背叛。比起訊息真偽與否,破壞信任/親密感的背叛(information betrayal)恐怕才是真正觸發情緒反應並且付諸行動的關鍵。

Cyborg

無論是否願意,我們都已經成了賽博格(cyborg, 註3) — 是人與科技的混合體,也同時反應環境與虛構的造物。


註1:作為西德總理,威利.布蘭特(Willy Brandt)最出名的,大概是讓他得到諾貝爾和平獎的華沙之跪,不過這裡指的是他擔任國際發展議題獨立委員會(Independent Commission on International Development Issues)主席時的那份布蘭特報告

註2:以上敘述超出我個人語境許多,歡迎熟悉傅柯的朋友指正。

註3:詳見 Haraway, D. (1985) «A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century». Simians, cyborgs and women: the reinvention of nature, 149–81.(中譯本由群學出版)

Disinformation & Discourse: Notes from Symposium

Disinformation and Filter bubble

(Note: This is remark from 1-day symposium at August 21 in Jakarta, Indonesia by Digital Asia Hub, Berkman Klein Center and Chatham House. I participated on behalf of Open Knowledge Taiwan. The symposium adopted Chatham House Rule, so I will only write about what has been discussed in the symposium without specified the speaker unless it is already in public)

The global disinformation landscape

What is disinformation? In Chinese we often use the fakenews (假新聞) or disinformation (不實消息). But the distinction is not very clear. Based on the “Information Disorder” report by Council of Europe, we can find the following definition:

  • Dis-information. Information that is false and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization or country.
  • Mis-information. Information that is false, but not created with the intention of causing harm.
  • Mal-information. Information that is based on reality, used to inflict harm on a person, organization or country.

Such distinction is based on a spectrum from “falseness” to “intend to harm.” When the term “fake news” is used, usually it is in the context of “disinformation” and “misinformation.” Within this broad spectrum, several distinct types of problematic contents exist.Fake news. It’s complicated.
By Claire Wardle, First Draft News Research Directormedium.com

Among them, the satire content receives less attention. But it is potentially a source of misinformation/disinformation, depending on how much the harm will do. Satire, art, comedy and humor are also freedom of expression that may subject to state interference.

People’s Daily Quotes the Onion: Kim Jong Eun ‘Sexiest Man Alive’
The People’s Daily newspaper posted on its website a 55-photo slideshow dedicated to North Korean dictator Kim Jong…blogs.wsj.com

Is freedom of expression only about “correct” information? Not necessarily so, as pointed out by David Kaye. It can be a tool of authoritarian state. This has become a huge controversy for Malaysia’s anti-fake news law, as Barisan Nasional aims at silencing any criticism before the general election.

Legal approach

Germany’s Network Enforcement Act (Netzdurchsetzunggesetz, or NetzDG) is probably the most widely cited example as a legal approach for fake news. But it has been criticized by both academic and civil society for following reasons:

  1. Difficulty to define the scope “big social media networks”
  2. Take-down within 24 hour if obviously illegal and within 7 days for the rest is a possible violation of freedom of speech guarantees

Germany: Flawed Social Media Law
The new German law that compels social media companies to remove hate speech and other illegal content can lead to…www.hrw.org

Although German scholar sent a clear message said “Don’t copy German’s approach,” it couldn’t stop Russia from direct copy-and-paste into national law.

Russian bill is copy-and-paste of Germany’s hate speech law | Reporters without borders
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) condemns a Russian bill that would force social networks to remove “unlawful” content…rsf.org

What remain to be seen are the transboundary cases. Although the offense may be sanctioned even if it is not committed in Germany, no foreign case has been established so far. As mentioned by the speaker, there are some discussion about whether the mutual legal assistance in criminal matters between US and Germany covers the criminal offense on “big social networks.”

Role of Platform

Platforms are based on attention-seeking economy works a bit different from advertising. Thus, platforms have a complex role in fake news as it has some clear economical drives. During the symposium, we found local differences that changes the way platform interact:

Why Facebook is losing the war on hate speech in Myanmar
YANGON, Myanmar – In April, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg told U.S. senators that the social media site was hiring…www.reuters.com

Disinformation and democracy in Indonesia – New Mandala
“Fake news” has become a buzzword in the contemporary political lexicon around the world. In Indonesia, there has been…www.newmandala.org

How South Korea’s Fake News Hijacked a Democratic Crisis
On Thursday night, South Korean president Park Geun-Hye was officially ousted from her office after a special…gizmodo.com

Different platforms has different approaches. But like many other occasions, the most discussed platform did not have someone to speak on their behalf in this symposium. In additions, it’s often the case that platform under/overestimating the capacity of user in solving the disinformation. AI is unlikely to solve it either.

Final Remark

Fakenews is like Monster “Hydra” : you chop one head and there will be two grow out immediately.

Most of the participant agree that quality journalism, media diversity and digital literacy can be solution in the long term. Although not mentioning explicitly in the symposium, the problems identified are mostly about trust. There are some questions may be worth thinking about:

  • What can we learn from other behavior-change campaign? (such as in public health)
  • After the war is over, what kind of society we would like to have?


《開放的時代:領導、風險與未來的機會》後記

上週三開放知識基金會創辦人Rufus Pollock來台的公開活動,感謝Rocket.cafe的邀請,以及科技部、電信所提供的協助。演講以及簡報週一也都放上網了

我的部份,是談去年台北魚客松的經驗,雖然去年八月寫過這篇,但一直沒有機會分享整個來龍去脈,剛好趁這次全部講完。還記得當時第一次開會,AIT負責的同仁就問我:滔滔會不會組隊參賽呢?

這點滔滔夥伴在會前就討論過了,我們的答案是:不會。除了現實上的考量外,也是因為由擁有領域知識 (domain knowlege) 優勢的我們參賽,雖然可能會增加得名的機會,但讓對漁業陌生的參賽者有機會接觸這些議題,才能夠使魚客松這個活動發揮最大的價值。如果最終目標是永續發展,光是我們懂不夠,我們希望大家都懂。

以我自己來說,只要任何人能夠從約30分鐘的演講,和30多張的簡報中得到一點靈感,或者對於如何創新有其他想法,那滔滔去年的努力和我的分享,就有價值。

從空軍個人定位發報機 (PLB) 採購談起

上週六補班,監察院公開一份調查報告,針對去年9/22空軍AT-3教練機失事,而為何個人定位發報機 (PLB) 遲遲未從PRC-90換裝至SARBE6-406G一事進行調查。由於其中披露原先預備替換PRC-90的AN/URT-44,因失誤率過高而向美方求償,所以也被寫成一則新聞。

昨天另外有記者拿著這則新聞,去立法院堵訪兩名外交國防委員會所屬,但不同黨籍的立委,竟異口同聲的表示採購驗收過程有瑕疵,國軍需要檢討等等……實在看的我一頭霧水,堵訪的記者和兩名立委,應該都沒有看過還不到十頁的調查報告吧?

這項採購並非監察委員在報告中點出的疏失。 Continue reading 從空軍個人定位發報機 (PLB) 採購談起

刻板印象的陷阱

 

聽說荷蘭恩荷芬 (Eindhoven) 市長 Rob van Gijzel 這幾天在台灣。

他近年多次訪台,也是柯文哲2015就任後,一月就來訪的外賓。記得當時柯市長是這麼說的

During the meeting, the two mayors exchanged views on development – especially those regarding the projects with Shezi Island (社子島) and Guandu Plains(關渡平原).

Ko recalled the famous saying: “God created the sea, but the Dutch created the Land.” Noting how the city is able to learn from the experience of the European nation, he promised to contact them if Taipei needs assistance with technical knowledge in the future.

這些描述對低地國荷蘭的沿海地區,比如阿姆斯特丹、鹿特丹、甚至葛羅寧根,可能都還算貼切。偏偏靠近內陸,鄰近比利時邊境的恩荷芬,是荷蘭少數在海平面上的都市。沒聽過市場花園作戰就算了,但恩荷芬不僅是飛利浦的發源地,也以創新、工業設計見長。

刻板印象實在害人不淺,慎之。

紅十字會只是特權團體嗎?

其實我對災難發生後,又開始出現對紅十字會的負面言論感到有點厭煩。組織一大,參與的人就變得複雜,這是很難避免的,或許我也沒辦法幫他們講話。而對於不關注紅會相關訊息的人來說,大概更沒聽過美國紅會因為捐款流向不明,以及Sandy颶風時應變不足飽受批評,使眾議院提出紅會陽光法案草案一事。

回到台灣,常態性開設緊急救護、水域救生相關課程,有辦法統整第一線救難人員和資源的,就是紅會。現在在台南現場的救難人員,無論是民間救難組織和消防人員,很多都有參與紅會訓練、或是協助開課。

另外,他們每年夏季在台灣最常發生溺水事件的水域駐點,像是三峽大豹溪、基隆外木山、高雄西子灣等,這些都是不收分文的志工。我還真想不出,台灣有哪個其他組織願意數十年如一日的從事這些工作。

還有最近吵的厲害的志願救難團體登錄問題,我可以告訴各位,紅十字會不但有登錄,每一次的萬安演習各縣市支會都有派員參與,和慈濟同為參加人數前二名的民間團體。

你可以不認同他們,或是不捐錢,但是直接讓他們黑到底,我是覺得有點過頭了。對於特權,紅會代表在記者會上說的沒錯,問題就在於紅會確實是跟日內瓦公約有密切關係的特殊組織,而各國大多以設立專法或行政命令來賦予其權力*,對此紅會也釋出善意表示願意討論修法,卻不見有任何人願意就此討論。

另外,我也很常碰到有人說,我們不是條約締結國所以不需要管這個或那個,國內執法都搞不定了還管國際公約等等。雖然退出聯合國或許是情勢所逼,但三十幾年後,依舊有這樣自外於世界的想法,實在讓人費解。如果我們認同公約的精神,比如日內瓦公約所代表的戰時國際人道救援規範,而不是認為這只是台灣國內的事情,那要做的應該是積極去處理、解決爭議,就像前述的美國紅會陽光法案,就是希望能改進其透明度不足以及組織龐大運作不良的問題。

(3/16 補述:另見政大宋承恩老師社論